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Introduction 
 In a significant policy statement1 released toward the end of 2005 the 
United States outlined its strategy for victory in Iraq. Victory is defined in terms 
of a sequential set of completed goals: (1) Short term, Iraq is making steady 
progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic 
institutions, and standup security forces; (2) Medium term, Iraq is in the lead 
defeating terrorists and providing its own security, with a fully constitutional 
government in place and on its way to achieving its economic potential; and (3) 
Longer term, Iraq is peaceful, united, stable and secure, well integrated into the 
international community and a full partner in the war on terrorism. 
 
 The US strategy is essentially three pronged: developing democracy, 
providing security and reviving the economy.  In the economic area U.S. and 
coalition efforts have focused on helping Iraq restore the country’s neglected 
and damaged infrastructure with the goal of restoring and expanding essential 
services. Other objectives include: the creation of a market based economy, and 
greater transparency and accountability in the public sector.2 
 
 The logic of this strategy is straight-forward: 3 
 
1. The rebuilding or Iraq’s infrastructure and the provision of 
essential services will increase the confidence of Iraqis in their 
government and help convince them that the government is 
offering a brighter future.  People will then be more likely to 
cooperage with the government and provide intelligence against 
the enemy, creating a less hospitable environment for the 
terrorists and insurgents. 
 
                                                 
1 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (Washington: National Security Council, November 2005). 
2 Ibid., p. 22. 
3 Ibid. 
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2. Efforts in the reconstruction realm have significant implications in 
the security realm when they focus on rebuilding post-conflict 
cities and towns. Compensations for civilians hurt by 
counterterrorism operations and the restoration of some 
economic vibrancy to areas formerly under terrorist control can 
help ease resentment and win over an otherwise suspicious 
population. 
 
3. Economic growth and reform of Saddam-era laws and regulations 
will be critical to ensuring that Iraq can support and maintain the 
new security institutions that the country is developing, attract 
new investment to Iraq, and become a full, integrated member of 
the international community. 
 
4. Economic growth and market reform – the promotion of Iraq’s 
private sector – are necessary to expand job opportunities for the 
youthful Iraqi population and decrease unemployment that makes 
some Iraqis more vulnerable to terrorist or insurgent recruiting. 
 
While this strategy has many merits, it is basically a continuation of the 
long term approach taken by Ambassador Bremer and the Coalition Provisional 
Government (CPA) in 2003.  Subsequent to the release of the NDS Ambassador 
Bremer expressed reservations over the course he set out for Iraq’s economic 
recovery: 
 
We also placed too much emphasis on large-scale reconstruction 
projects. While the urgent need for modern highways, electrical 
generating plants and the like was clear, we should have anticipated 
that building them would take a long time.  Our earlier efforts should 
have been directed more tightly at meeting Iraqis’ day-to-day needs.4 
 
Iraqis themselves are increasingly skeptical of the ability of this strategy 
to produce lasting economic gains and a semblance of stability. Certainly the 
ability to complete infrastructure projects on time and within budget has 
proven to be a nearly impossible task. As noted by the U.S. Inspector General 
for Iraq Reconstruction infrastructure programs in that country have been 
plagued by “violence, corruption and mismanagement.”5  As a result “the 
ambitious US reconstruction effort in Iraq is likely to fall far short of its goals 
because soaring security costs and poor management have slashed the amount 
of American money available for rebuilding projects.”6 Just as serious is the all 
                                                 
4 L. Paul Bremer, “In Iraq, Wrongs Made a Right,” New York Times, January 13, 2006. 
5 Quoted in Tom regan, “US Inspector General for Iraq Paints ‘Grim’ Picture of Reconstruction 
Effort,” Christian Science Monitor, November 1, 2005. 
6 Ibid. 
Rough Draft – Comments Welcome 
3 of 49 
too apparent long lead time before any tangible benefits in terms of improved 
living standards are seen by the average Iraqi. 
 
 Implicit in Ambassador Bremer’s assessment is that the main flaw in the 
US strategy has been its inability to deliver short-run economic gains to large 
segments of the Iraqi population. Unfortunately the NDS does little to address 
this issue, and appears content simply continuing the existing strategy.  
 
Specifically, other than noting that oil revenues will assist in financing 
infrastructure and much of the country’s capital expenditures, the NDS does 
not explicitly address the role of oil in Iraq’s future.  Yet there is a vast literature 
suggesting that the oil sector and the allocation of its revenues is the critical 
variable in shaping both the economic structure and political systems of 
countries like Iraq. For the most part this literature focuses on the so called “oil 
curse” or the “paradox of plenty.” 7 These colorful phrases capture the gist of 
oil’s potentially destructive powers -- unless properly managed oil revenues 
more often than not undermine the economic, political and social fabric of 
countries irrespective of how well intended their long run goals and objectives. 
The result is often the creation of a rentier state mired in corruption, economic 
mismanagement, and authoritarianism. 
 
Also complicating Iraq’s recovery is the fact that we still don’t have a 
complete picture of the contemporary dynamics of the Iraqi economy.  Clearly 
factors such as the “brain drain,” the lack of commercial credit8 together with 
uncertainty due to the security situation have largely brought investment in the 
formal segments of the economy to a halt9.   
 
A third of Iraq's professional class is reported to have fled to Jordan, a 
flight of skills worse than under Saddam. UN monitors now report 2,000 
people a day are crossing the Syrian border. Over a hundred lecturers at 
Baghdad University alone have been murdered, mostly for teaching 
women. There are few places in Iraq where women can go about 
unattended or unveiled. Gunmen arrived earlier this month at a Baghdad 
television station and massacred a dozen of the staff, an incident barely 
thought worth reporting. The national museum is walled up. Electricity 
supply is down to four hours a day. No police uniform can be trusted. 
The arrival anywhere of an army unit can be prelude to a mass killing ….. 
                                                 
7 Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms in Petro-States (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1997). 
8 Cf. Robert Looney, “Building from Scratch: The Transformation of Post-War Iraq’s Financial 
System,” Middle East Policy 12:1 (Spring 2005), pp. 134-149. 
9 “Unemployment Caused by Insecurity and Vice-Versa,” IRINnews.org (November 29, 2004). 
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All intelligence out of Iraq suggests this is no longer a functioning 
state.10 
 
Yet, from antidotal accounts11 there are indications that many areas of 
the shadow economy are prospering and, as during the period of sanctions, 
successfully adapting to the harsh environment.  On the other hand, the 
shadow economy has provided a boon to criminal gangs and a major source of 
funding for the insurgency.12  
 
With these themes in mind, the purpose of the sections that follow is to 
examine the means by which the economy can contribute toward building a 
viable new Iraq.  First, an assessment is made of key issues surrounding the 
economy: (a) what were the initial obstacles to the economy’s reconstruction? 
(b) The approach taken towards the economy in the post-war period? (c) The 
major accomplishments and failures? (d) The lessons learned? (e) How has the 
development of the economy assisted the insurgents and criminal groups? 
Second, this assessment of Iraq’s economic progress to-date suggests several 
key areas as critical to the success of Marine efforts at stability operations and 
nation building in Iraq.  A final section outlines a broad economic strategy that 
the Marines might consider in assisting their efforts to bring stability to the al 
Anbar region.   
 
To this end, the following sections draw on a wide range of on-going 
research conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School.  In particular. 
 
x The size, expansion and implications of Iraq’s informal economy 
incorporating theories of corruption – The business of insurgency.13 
 
x Economic Reforms and Efforts at reconstruction drawing on the 
experience Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union – Dynamics of  
vicious and virtuous circles.14 
                                                 
10 Simon Jenkins, “America Has Finally Taken on the Grim Reality of Iraq,” The Guardian, 
October 18, 2006 
11 For example: David Hecht, “Why War Zones Love Monopolies,” Fortune 149:11 (May 31, 
2004), p. 66; Jeffrey Fleishman, “In the New Baghdad, Viagra a Hot Sell,” Los Angeles Times, 
June 17, 2004; Stanley Reed, “The Kurds Embrace a New Cause: Rivals are Uniting Behind 
Economic Development in the Northern Iraqi Region,” Business Week, January 12, 2004, p. 48. 
12 Robert Looney, “The Business of Insurgency: The Expansion of Iraq’s Shadow Economy,” The 
National Interest, Fall 2005. 
13 Robert Looney, “Economic Consequences of Conflict: The Rise of Iraq’s Informal Economy, 
Journal of Economic Issues, XL:4, December 2006; Robert Looney, “The Business of Insurgency: 
The Expansion of Iraq’s Shadow Economy,” The National Interest 81, Fall 2005 
14 Robert Looney, “Middle East Reform Initiatives: A Stage Theory Perspective,” International 
Journal of World Peace 22:1 (March 2005); Robert Looney, “Reform Initiatives for Iraq and the 
Middle East: The Search for What Works,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 
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x The evolving nature of Iraq’s insurgency employing theories of netwar.15 
 
x The Use of Foreign aid/Assistance to combat terrorism/extremism/and 
terrorist recruitment.16 
 
x Civil Society in Iraq.17 
 
x Third Generation Gangs and Insurgencies18. 
 
 These separate bodies of research form the basis of a comprehensive 
framework (Figure 1) for understanding the evolution of the Iraqi insurgency. 
Drawing on the dynamics of this framework, the sections below are focused on 
identifying the critical role that the Marines can play in restoring order and 
economic prosperity to Iraq. 
Efforts at Reconstruction 
Even without the insurgency, Iraq’s reconstruction would have been a 
monumental undertaking.  As the NDS notes, Saddam Hussein’s economic 
legacy will be present for some time. In particular, that regime’s questionable 
economic policies, its mismanagement of the economy together with political 
repression, internal conflicts, wars and sanctions left a number of serious 
impediments to recovery and growth. Initial reconstruction efforts dealt largely 
with correcting and reversing the effects of these debilitating forces that had 
built up over the years:19  
 
x Restoring government economic functions after looting and state 
collapse; 
x Preventing currency collapse, hyperinflation and economic chaos; 
x Rebuilding infrastructure ravaged by war, sanctions, looting and 
neglect; 
x Rehabilitating a health care system cut off from medical advances for 
two decades; 
x Dismantling corrupt, dysfunctional state economic controls; and  
                                                                                                                                                 
28:1 (Fall, 2004); Robert Looney, “The Economics of Iraqi Reconstruction,” Strategic Insights, 
V:5 (May 2006). 
15 John Arquilla and David Ronfelt eds., Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and 
Militancy,  Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001 
16 Robert Looney, “Failed Economic Take-Offs and Terrorism in Pakistan: Conceptualizing a Proper Role 
for U.S. Assistance,” Asia Survey XLIV:6 (November/December 2004). 
17 Abbas Kadhim, “Civil-Military Relations in Iraq (1921-2006): An Introductory Survey,” Strategic 
Insights V:5 (May 2006). 
18 Nicholas I. Haussler, Third Generation Gangs Revisited: The Iraq Insurgency. Masters Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, September 2005.  
19 Anne Ellen Henderson, The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Economic 
Reconstruction in Iraq (Washington: United States Institute for Peace, April 2005), p.3. 
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A number of major successes did occur, especially under the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA).  Major successes under the CPA included: 
 
x Re-established nationwide food-ration system; 
x Introduced a new currency and stabilized the exchange rate; 
x Liberated most prices without igniting inflation; 
x Rebuild the government’s economic ministries; 
x Promulgated market-oriented banking, taxation, foreign trade; 
investment, and business regulations; 
x Rehabilitated several thousand schools, health clinics, and hospitals; 
x Provided public services to populations that had been deprived under 
Saddam; 
x Increased electrical generation and output; and 
x Funded small projects across Iraq to meet critical community needs. 
 
Still the Coalition’s economic accomplishments were overshadowed by 
its unfulfilled promises. During the occupation the CPA failed or was unable to: 
 
x Prevent rampant looting or infrastructure and production facilities; 
x Attract foreign investment; 
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x Implement its newly enacted economic regulations; 
x Restructure state-owned industries; 
x Fulfill promises of substantial job creation; 
x Meet targets for electricity production (despite increases); 
x Restore oil output to prewar levels; 
x Eliminate costly distorting energy and food subsidies; 
x Combat corruption in reconstruction projects; and 
x Spend more than a fraction of the $18.4 billion the U.S. Congress 
allocated for Iraq’s reconstruction. 
 
Clearly, post-war economic progress has been disappointing. While a 
number of economic obstacles and distortions are lessening as a result of the 
reforms20 put in place by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), others were 
created or reinforced through post-war policy errors and miscalculations.21 The 
net result is an economy whereby22: 
 
1. The oil sector dominates the economy, accounting for around 74% of 
GDP. Iraq now depends solely on oil exports for finance of investment 
and consumption expenditures, for government revenues – of which oil 
export proceeds exceed 93%, and for 98 percent of foreign currency 
earnings. 
 
2. Centralized decision making and intrusion of the state into economic life 
have distorted the pricing structure in many key sectors. In particular 
prices of food and energy do not reflect the true costs of production. In 
turn, distorted prices have caused inefficiencies and waste. 
 
3. The public sector is over represented in the economy, leading to 
inefficiency and decreased growth.  Many state enterprises (SOEs) are 
currently dormant. The weakness of the private sector has limited its role 
in economic development, increasing the lack of diversification. 
 
4. Social inequalities are widespread in a broad range of fields covering 
health, education, public services, social services to low-income groups, 
the disabled, internally displaced persons, refugees, single-parent 
households, and other vulnerable groups, across geographic areas. 
 
                                                 
20 Cf. Robert Looney, “Iraq’s Economic Transition: the Neoloberal Model and its Role,” The 
Middle East Journal 57:4 (Autumn, 2003), pp. 568-587. 
21 Documented in Robert Looney, “The Viability of Shock therapy in Iraq,” Challenge, 47:5 
(September – October 2004), pp. 86-103. 
22 The Iraqi Strategic Review Board, National Development Strategy 2005-2007 (Baghdad: The 
Ministerial Committee on The National Development Strategy, September 2004), pp. 3-4. 
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5. With over 50% of the population under 24 years of age, rapid rates of 
population growth are likely for many years.  Many in this large 
demographic group are alienated due to violence and limited access to 
education, training and career prospects. 
6. Widespread unemployment, climbing to over 50% in some regions such 
as al-Anbar, combined with absolute poverty where more than 60% of 
the population depends on the government’s rationed food basket have 
led to an increase in demands for social assistance. 
 
7. Poor governance practices are common including widespread nepotism 
in public appointments and corruption among public servants.  The lack 
of accountability and transparency in managing state resources has 
abetted corruption and increased its corrosive effect on growth and 
efficiency. 
 
8. Iraq’s decades long isolation has resulted in the digital divide, outdated 
institutions, administrative systems and know-how.  Technological 
stagnation and the use of outmoded production methods have 
weakened the economy as a whole. 
 
9. Public sector institutions have witnessed serious looting, theft and 
destruction. 
 
10. Another legacy of the past was the total dependence on monetary 
expansion to finance the deficit in the budget, which led to an average 
inflation rate of 50% annually during the 1990s. While monetary policy 
is now on a sounder footing with the creation of an independent central 
bank, lack of a developed government bond market together with 
supply side shocks have resulted in volatile movements in price and an 
inflation rate that appears to be accelerating.  
 
11. While the traditional family unit and the community have remained the 
core of Iraqi society, ensuring solidarity and social cohesion, conflict and 
inequality have eroded the social fabric of communities and families over 
the past three decades. 
 
12. Historically, Iraqi social capital in the form of family and tribal networks 
had acted as a safety net against adverse shocks. Much of this capital 
has been destroyed through violence, dislocation, and the collapse of 
supporting institutions. 
 
13. Civic participation and recognition of human rights were denied during 
the previous regime. They remain poorly understood and lack ancillary 
support structures. 
Rough Draft – Comments Welcome 
9 of 49 
14. A large informal economy coexists with the formal sector.  This informal 
economy may account for as much as 65% of Gross Domestic Product.23 
Even more worrisome is the large criminal element that controls large 
segments of the informal sector.24 
 
A recent UNDP25 household survey documents the impact these factors are 
having on the average Iraqi household: 
 
1. The UNDP survey suggests the poorest 20% of the population earns 7% 
of the income, while the top 20% earns 44%. 
 
2. Iraq’s median household income of 144 dollars has dropped from a 
post-war high of 255 dollars in 2003. 
 
3. One-third of Iraqis canvassed by UNDP described themselves as being 
among the poor. 
 
4. One-sixth of interviewees met all or most of the criteria suggesting that 
they lived beneath the poverty line. 
Patterns of Success and Failure 
As the discussion above suggests, reconstruction efforts to date have 
been characterized by some successes, but unfortunately a greater number of 
failures. Following Henderson26, several patterns emerge. Most importantly, the 
Coalition’s success stores shared some essential elements. Its less successful 
ventures had their own set of distinctive characteristics. Specifically, successful 
initiatives appear to have imposed no major costs or sacrifices on the 
population at large.  For instance, most Iraqis welcomed the rehabilitation of 
their schools and hospitals. Also, successful initiatives did not suffer from 
security disruptions. This was either because the security situation was not a 
constraining factor—as with creation of new banking regulations—or because 
effective steps were taken to provide security protection—as with the 
nationwide distribution of civil-service salaries. 
 
High visibility was another condition for success. Projects prioritized by 
Washington or the Coalition leadership, such as the introduction of a new Iraqi 
currency, were lavished with support.  Funding was also a key element. Projects 
                                                 
23 Robert Looney, “The Economics of Coping: The Plight of Women in Iraq’s Informal Economy,” 
Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 30:3 (Fall 2005), pp. 285-303. 
24 Robert Looney, “The Business of Insurgency: The Expansion of Iraq’s Shadow Economy,” The 
National Interest 81 (Fall 2005), pp;. 67-72. 
25 United Nations Development Program, Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004, Volume I: 
Tabulation Report (Baghdad: Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology, 
Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, 2005) 
26 Op. cit., pp. 4-5. 
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that could be funded quickly, without going through cumbersome contracting 
channels achieved rapid results.  For instance, the military’s highly successful 
(but under-funded) CERP (Commander’s Emergency Response Program) funds 
were used to respond immediately to pressing community needs.  Programs 
that built on existing Iraqi capacity were also more likely to succeed.  The child 
vaccination program which took advantage of a strong Iraqi outreach 
capability is a case in point.  Finally, successful policies tended to be finite in 
scope and limited in duration – involving, for example the approval of a new 
law or the one-time distribution of textbooks to schools. 
 
The Coalition’s failures were marked by a very different set of conditions. 
Failure often coincided with high social cost. For instance, the coalition’s 
inability to end fuel price subsidies reflected its fears of sparking mass unrest. 
Also most failed initiatives were afflicted by security disruptions, such as 
looting and sabotage that precluded sustained progress.  Lack of powerful 
patrons was another handicap typical of unsuccessful projects.  For instance 
plans for agricultural reconstruction languished with a committed CPA sponsor.  
Funding problems also characterized failed projects.  Many projects ran into 
disabling delays when they encountered the complex U.S. government 
procurement process.   
 
Another common element of policy failure was lack of existing Iraqi 
capacity on which to build.  Efforts to collect taxes for example failed because 
did not have a history of voluntary compliance or the organizational capacity to 
monitor incomes.  Finally, unsuccessful policies tended to involve extensive 
structural changes. The Coalition’s inability to combat endemic corruption 
illustrates the difficulties in altering long-standing practices and relationships.  
 
Perhaps because reconstruction efforts to date did not effectively 
incorporate large segments of the Iraqi population into the decision making 
process there is a wide spread perception among Iraqis that the coalition 
efforts have been a failure.  One ABC survey of Iraqis interviewed in late 2005 
found that: 27 
 
Only 44 percent of Iraqis say they believe things are going well in their 
country; 52 percent said they felt the country was "doing badly." Support 
for the U.S.-led invasion has dropped: In February 2004, 39 percent of 
Iraqis told us they believed the invasion was wrong, but today that 
number stands at 50 percent. Even among optimistic Iraqis it appears 
the U.S. gets little credit for any improvements in their lives. Fewer than 
one in five Iraqis believes that U.S. reconstruction efforts have been 
"effective." Most Iraqis now say they "disapprove strongly" of how the 
                                                 
27 “Fourth Installment of Where Things Stand in Iraq” ABC News, December 12, 2005 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/print?id=1378209 
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U.S. has operated in Iraq. Not surprisingly, the percentage of Iraqis today 
who oppose the U.S. presence has spiked -- from 51 percent to 65 
percent.  
 
Virtually all signs of optimism vanish when one is interviewing Iraq's 
Sunni Muslims. There's more on this in the Local Government section of 
the report; suffice for now to cite a pair of poll results. While 54 percent 
of Shia Muslims believe the country is in better shape than it was before 
the war, only 7 percent of Sunnis believe the same. Optimism about 
security -- 80 percent of Shias and 94 percent of Kurds say they feel safer 
-- is absent among Sunnis. Only 11 percent of Iraq's Sunni Muslims say 
they feel safer than they did under Saddam.  
Many Iraqis cannot understand why -- two-and-a-half years after the 
Americans arrived -- electricity and sewage are not more reliable, why 
more reconstruction projects have not reached their neighborhoods, 
why corruption remains so prevalent and why their local (and in many 
cases democratically elected) officials have not changed things for the 
better.  
 
These survey results were not unique.  Another respected poll 
undertaken in the first week of January 2006 found a sharp split between 
Kurds, Shi’ites and Sunnis over the U.S. aid efforts in Iraq. Over the various 
categories of U.S efforts, 38% of the Kurds expressed approval, falling to 30.3% 
for Shi’ites and 4.7% for Sunnis. The corresponding figures for disapproval 
were 11.3%, 14.8% and 77.7% 
Lessons Learned 
The post war Iraqi reconstruction experience points to some important 
lessons.  These can provide a useful set of guides for the Marines’ attempts in 
restoring economic growth and stability.28 
 
Reconstruction entails painful trade-offs rather than easy choices. 
Perhaps the major made in the early days of reconstruction was a tendency to 
try to get things done as quickly as possible.  To do this the CPA often bypassed 
Iraqi Ministries and various local groups. More often than not, Iraqis and their 
viewpoints were not included in the process. This flaw continues to take a tool 
on the country’s reconstruction efforts. 
 
High hopes and lofty promises are no substitute for sound planning and 
prudent expectations.  As we receive clearer accounts of the functioning of the 
CPA it is shocking to find how little planning went into the effort.  
 
                                                 
28 Anne Ellen Henderson, The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Economic 
Reconstruction in Iraq (Washington: United States Institute for Peace, April 2005), pp. 5-16. 
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Control expectations to realistic levels.  Because the CPA had promised to 
quickly exceed rather than simply restore prewar production its many 
accomplishments were often seen by the Iraqis as failures instead. 
  
For any actions develop several contingency plans. Proper contingency 
planning taking into account the possibility of infrastructure degradation, 
persistent violence and revenue shortfalls would have resulted in more realistic 
reconstruction goals. 
  
Economic reconstruction depends upon adequate security; yet security 
depends on successful reconstruction. While the CPA was quite aware of the 
needs for security, it did not appear to realize that its reconstruction efforts 
reconstruction should be focused not on just constructing physical buildings 
such as schools, but instead primarily on creating an environment in which the 
average Iraqi would feel secure. Delays should have been avoided if at all 
possible. Instead the many of the CPA’s self-inflicted delays in project 
implementation contributed to Iraqi feelings of resentment and despair, which, 
in turn, fueled insurgency and crime thereby worsening the security climate. 
 
Reconstruction requires coordination of short-term initiatives and long-
term structural reforms. The coalition’s short-term successes in economic 
stabilization and small-scale reconstruction generated positive momentum for 
economic recovery. Yet the CPA’s inability to carry through with longer-term 
programs such as restoring sate-owned enterprises, creating sustainable jobs, 
and promoting private sector growth resulted in lost momentum and further 
Iraqi frustration.  
 
Don’t Over-Rely on Market Forces in a Conflict Setting. In part, the loss in 
reconstruction momentum stemmed from the CPA’s assumption that market 
forces and a surge in private investment would follow the initial reconstruction 
efforts. Ideological blinders29 and the lack of a contingency plan made it 
difficult to overcome these errors when confronted with the effects of 
increased violence and uncertainty. 
 
Ongoing reforms require empowered owners. It remains to be seen 
whether Iraq’s new government will be willing or able to continue economic 
reforms initiated under the CPA. Clearly if Iraqis had been consulted and made 
an integral part of the reform process they would be more inclined to continue 
and build on earlier efforts.  As of early 2006, the reform process is being 
largely controlled by the International Monetary Fund, with Iraqis again more in 
the position of resisting outside efforts at reform, largely removal of subsidies 
                                                 
29 Robert Looney, “The Viability of Iraq’s Shock Therapy,” Challenge 47:5 (September-October 
2004), pp. 86-103. 
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and price controls, rather than controlling and adapting the reform process to 
meet their own domestic priorities.30 
 
Broad-based participation is critical for maintaining reform momentum, 
but requires overcoming centralization tendencies. Creating Iraqi ownership of 
reconstruction also required decentralization of government authority. 
Decentralization has been shown to strengthen accountability and stimulate 
economic recovery in other post conflict and transitional settings.  
Unfortunately the CPA was successful in overcoming Ministry opposition 
securing funding for local authorities and Iraqi citizens to participate directly in 
the reconstruction process.  
 
Overcoming and controlling corruption is extremely difficult. Corruption 
thrives in the environment of post-conflict reconstruction.  The combination of 
large public procurement projects, minor funding infusions, and inadequate 
government regulatory mechanisms creates fertile ground for corrupt practices.  
In the Iraqi context, a long history of entrenched corruption in government 
economic management only compounded the problem.  
Considerations for Future Efforts 
Anthony Cordesman’s blunt assessment of the problems the U.S. 
encountered in reconstructing the economy provides another insight as to the 
changes that will have to take place if economic progress is to occur if 
economic growth is to be revived anytime soon.  In large part, earlier efforts 
failed because they were not capable of adjusting to the growing insurgency 
and criminal threats.  On the other hand the top-down approach would have 
most likely encountered numerous constraints. As Cordesman notes: 31 
 
 1. The U.S. government simply lacks the core competence, personnel and 
financial resources to take on such a massive undertaking as the reconstruction 
of a failed economy of 25 plus million people. “The illusion that the US can 
remake a national economy, as distinguished from aiding a nation to do so is 
simply dangerous. So is the idea that the US has or ever will have the cadre of 
experts necessary to carry out such tasks at the career civilian, contract, and 
military level.  The CPA, USAID and the Corps of Engineers simply showed again 
and again that the US could not provide workable plans and program 
management for an aid effort of the scale involved, and that reliance on US 
prime contractors and their subcontractors did noting to reduce waste and 
corruption.” 
 
                                                 
30 Robert Looney, “The IMF’s Return to Iraq,” Challenge 49:3 (May/June 2006), pp 68-82. 
31 Anthony Cordesman, “The Importance of building Local Capabilities: Lessons from the 
Counterinsurgency in Iraq,”  Draft, CSIS August 1, 2006, pp. 20-21. 
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 2. In a conflict setting such as Iraq’s, the first priority is to use aid money 
as a tool to bring about stability and one that responds to operational needs.  
“There simply is no time to wait for structural change in the economy, for mid- 
to long-term projects to pay to pay off, for interesting experiments to work, by 
acting as if war, insurgency, crime and social violence can be ignored. Iraq and 
Afghanistan have also shown that US military officers and their US government 
civilian counterparts must have great discretion in using aid at the local level 
and essentially substitute dollars bur bullets.  Buying stability is cheaper by far 
than shooting for stability and much less provocative and destructive.  It also 
provides quick benefits in terms of results the local populace wants and sees, 
disperses aid into the most troubled areas, and builds political trust.” 
 
 Unfortunately at the present time and for the foreseeable future, 
circumstances in Iraq largely preclude activity by agencies that would normally, 
fund, organize and administer aid efforts.  “…it is clear that NGOs and 
international institutions are often unsuitable for such activities.  They cannot 
protect themselves and often will not allow the US military to do so.  They 
bring their own institutional agendas and priorities into the field and will not 
act in concert to achieve the kinds of operational results needed for security 
operations or to buy political support and consensus.  There are often times 
where this independence frees the US of political pressure, but stability 
operations and nation building needed to use short term aid for just the 
opposite purpose.” 
 
 3. The current security situation together with shrinking budgets for 
reconstruction mean that the U.S. aid strategy in Iraq will have to reorient itself 
from a top down approach to that of a grass-roots, bottom-up strategy.  “A 
reliance on local governments, businessmen, entrepreneurs and contractors at 
least keeps aid money in the country it is intended to benefit, shows the local 
populace that the US is directly aiding them, and responds to local needs and 
priorities.” 
 
 Cordesman’s three insightful observations point to the general direction 
a successful reconstruction effort must follow.  Clearly Coalition economic 
efforts will have to take on the dual role of reconstruction and 
counterinsurgency.   The specific form that effort takes will be conditioned by a 
number of interrelated factors including: (a) the growth and dynamics of the 
shadow or informal economy, (b) the deterioration in social capital,  and (c) the 
evolving relationship between tribes, gangs and the insurgency as conditioned 
by the dynamic interactions with (a) and (b).  
 The Shadow Economy 
When coalition officials arrived in Iraq after the war, they planned on 
turning Iraq into a free market economy – a model for capitalism in the Middle 
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East.32 As part of this plan, they expected private companies, both foreign and 
domestic, to play a leading role in jump-starting the economy. Free market 
incentives driven by pent-up demand and a massive aid-financed reconstruction 
program were thought to be sufficient to induce a massive wave of investment 
and hiring of Iraqi workers.33  But violence, crime and uncertainty over the 
future have undermined investor confidence, preventing market-driven 
mechanisms from playing their anticipated role. As a result nominal GDP 
contracted by about 35% in 2003.  It has recovered little since then, despite the 
U.S.-led reconstruction efforts.   
 
The only part of the economy to have survived both Saddam Hussein 
and the post-2003 period of instability and insurgency is the country’s informal 
economy. In fact, there is ample evidence that the country’s informal economy 
has expanded considerably since Saddam’s overthrow. In this regard, Iraq’s 
informal economy is following a pattern seen in other parts of the world – the 
informal economy tends to grow during periods of political, economic, and 
social crisis.   
 
Despite the obvious importance of the informal economy, it is barely 
mentioned in the many official economic reports. In fact, few systematic 
attempts have been made to integrate the analysis and quantification of the 
informal economy into an overall review of economic and military 
developments in Iraq.  This gap in our knowledge has hindered the 
development of a systematic framework for understanding and planning 
reconstruction and counterinsurgency strategies in the contemporary Iraqi 
setting. 
 
Preliminary analysis34 suggests, a clear pattern exists whereby the relative 
size of a country’s informal economy (as a share of Gross National Product) is 
related to its progress in opening up to the world economy.  Those countries 
that are relatively closed and inward oriented (like Iraq around the year 2000) 
tend to have large informal economies, while those countries open to the 
pressures of globalization have much smaller informal economies.  
Furthermore, the informal sector becomes significantly smaller as countries 
increase their control over corruption.   
 
As might have been expected, Iraq under Saddam was in a group of 
countries with the highest probability of possessing a large informal economy.  
                                                 
32 Cf. Robert Looney, “Iraq’s Economic Transition: The Neoliberal Model and Its Role,” The 
Middle East Journal 57:4 (Autumn 2003), pp.568-587. 
33 Ariana Eunjung Cha, “New U.S. Weapon: Jobs for Iraqi Men,” Washington Post, February 22, 
2004 p. A. 18. 
34 Cf. Robert Looney, “Iraq’s Shadow Economy,” Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e 
Commerciali (forthcoming, 2005). 
Rough Draft – Comments Welcome 
16 of 49 
The profile of these countries is an inward-oriented trade regime with high 
levels of corruption.  On this basis, Iraq’s shadow or informal economy 
probably accounted for around 35% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 200035 
with nearly 70 percent of the labor force in employed in informal activities.  
 
Since the fall of Saddam, Iraq’s informal economy has been affected by 
that country’s on-going crisis.  Clearly conflict and the insurgency have taken a 
heavy tool on the formal economy.  As private firms or public enterprises are 
downsized or closed due to conflict, retrenched workers often find the informal 
sector the only source of livelihood.  Also, in response to conflict driven 
inflation or cutbacks in public services, households have often needed to 
supplement formal sector incomes with informal earnings. In some parts of the 
country such as al Anbar, the breakdown of law and order has led to an 
expansion of criminal activity, some of which is carried out in the shadow 
economy – street vendors selling stolen merchandise etc.  
 
A partial list of factors contributing to the current expansion of Iraq’s 
shadow economy includes: 
 
x Compared with the previous regime, there is considerable political 
liberalization in Iraq.  In transition economies, this normally results in 
a larger informal economy. 
 
x The demand for services and trade is particularly high due the 
introduction of free trade soon after the fall of the Hussein regime.  
Again, this factor would encourage the development of an informal 
economy–petty retailing, street vending of imported goods, etc. 
  
x Increased bureaucratic discretion and associated corruption are 
greatly contributing to the informal economy. 
 
x Because of Iraq’s insurgency, institutional enforcements have 
weakened, thus allowing the incentives for informal activity to 
become very high. 
 
x The underdevelopment in the rule of law and related institutional 
enforcement mechanisms have not improved to date.  Given the 
insurgency, the enforcement mechanisms may have even declined. 
 
x In Iraq’s case, the present extremely low tax structures should not 
have been a contributing factor to the informal economy, but many 
marginal firms do not like to pay any taxes. 
                                                 
35 Ibid.. 
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x The macroeconomy has been relatively stable, but rising inflation in 
some areas may be contributing to an expansion of the informal 
economy. 
 
Of the items noted above, the most critical factor affecting the size of 
the informal economy is no doubt the inability of the Iraqi government to 
control corruption.  In addition, given the insurgency and uncertainty 
surrounding political developments, it is safe to say that large segments of the 
population have reverted to the survival relationships characteristic of the 
period of sanctions in the 1990s. This is confirmed daily with the news coming 
out of Iraq describing economic mismanagement,36 vast black markets in 
gasoline37, increased crime, and shortages of critical inputs.38  These 
developments do not bode well and suggests that the current size of the 
informal economy is considerably larger than in the late 1990s.  As noted 
above, another ominous sign39 is a recently released index of corruption for 
2004.  The prestigious Transparency International Corporation ranks Iraq as the 
most corrupt country in the Middle East.  In 2004 the country’s ranking  was 
129th out of 145 nations worldwide.  By 2005 it had fallen to 135 out of 158 
countries.40 
 
Based on these factors, it is likely that the size of the underground 
economy has expanded significantly beyond the 35% of GNP figure, noted 
above, for the end of the Hussein regime.  A safe estimate, in light of the 
insurgency and its detrimental impact on investment, electricity, and transport, 
would put the informal economy at around 65% of Gross National Product. 
This figure is reinforced by the unemployment stemming from the disbanding 
of the army and the anti-Baathist campaign following Saddam’s overthrow. 
 
In addition to the factors noted above, the informal economy may be 
growing simply because of the constraints limiting expansion of formal 
economic activity.  Just as private capital formation is often critical to the 
development of a thriving modern economy, social capital creation may be just 
as essential in creating the shift to more formal activities. Again, corruption 
plays a significant role in structuring the informal – this time through its effect 
on the country’s social capital.  Figure 2 provides a summary of the factors 
impacting on the country’s informal/shadow economy. 
                                                 
36 Sabri Zire Al-Saadi, “Iraq’s Post-War Economy: A Critical Review,” Middle East Economic 
Survey XLVII:14 (April 5, 2004. 
37 “Iraq: Report of Continuing Fuel and Electricity Shortages,” Noozz.com (January 23, 2005). 
38 Dan Murphy, “In Iraq, a Winter of Discontent,” Christian Science Monitor, January 10, 2005. 
39 Also see Adam Davidson, “Still on the Take: The U.S. Has Not Ended Iraq’s Culture of 
Corruption,” Los Angeles Times, May 2, 2004, p. M.1. 
40 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005 
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Figure 2 
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 The Deterioration in Social Capital 
Social capital refers to networks of relationships that bind people 
together.41  Social capitalists distinguish such relationships from physical capital 
and, the attributes of individuals, or human capital42.  In the context of Iraqi 
reconstruction and the establishment of a market economy, a key element of 
social capital centers on a component of social capital, the notion of trust.  
 
A growing literature43 on social capital stresses the importance of trust in 
the institutional infrastructure of a market economy.  The focus on trust is 
inspired by its importance for business formation, which in turn seems to be 
crucial for explaining the variation in economic performance in a large cross-
                                                 
41 An overview of the literature on social capital can be found in Martin Paldam, “Social Capital: 
One or Many? Definition and Measurement,” Journal of Economic Surveys 14:5 (December 
2000), pp. 629-654. 
42 Christopher Scanlon, “The Problems With Social Capital,” The Age (July 19, 2003). 
43 The following draws on Robert Looney, “Economic Consequences of Conflict: The Rise of Iraq’s 
Informal Economy,” Journal of Economic Issues, XL:4 (December 2006). 
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section of developing and transition economies. Entrepreneurship cannot 
flourish in an environment of distrust, since many economic opportunities are 
closed off.  As Nobel laureate, Kenneth Arrow, has noted: 
 
Almost every commercial transaction has within itself an element of 
trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be 
plausibly argued that much of economic backwardness in the world can 
be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.44 
 
The transition to a market economy experience of many of the former 
Communist countries suggests successful modernization and development take 
place through a web of diversified social life, mediated by families and 
communities, and the personal relationships of people within them.45  In a 
similar fashion, Fukuyama46 has identified trust as a central value in prosperous, 
highly productive societies.  Trust is a cornerstone of individuals’ ability to 
subordinate their own interests to those of larger groups and to associate and 
cooperate with each other to achieve economic purposes and other social 
satisfactions.  
 
Trust is such a critical factor in the development of modern economies 
because it motivates contacts with others and opens access for the exchange of 
goods and services.  It facilitates cooperation and cooperation in turn, breeds 
trust in a two way interaction necessary for the creation of long-term 
generalized norms for cooperation. Social capital thus represents a set of 
resources rooted in networks of relationships possessing the power to facilitate 
economic progress. There are three types of relationships among parties to an 
economic transaction, giving rise three different types of trust:47 
 
1. Ascribed Trust.  This first type of relationship is found among kinship 
groups and family members.  These relationships dominate economic 
transactions in subsistence economies and still characterize 
reproduction and the household economy (but also many small-scale 
crafts and trades).  
 
2. Process Based Trust.  This type of relationship is between individuals 
that have known each other for a long time, without sharing the 
loyalty to a specific group.  Most business networks are characterized 
                                                 
44 Kenneth Arrow, Altruism, Morality and Economic Theory (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 
1975). 
45 B. Berger, The Culture of Entrepreneurship (San Francisco: ICS  Press, 1991). 
46 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 
1995). 
47 Martin Raiser, “Trust in transition” http://www.colmud/hu/honesty-trist 
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by this type of repeated relationship and the prevalence of what 
develops as a process-based trust. 
  
3. Extended Trust.  This relationship is between individuals, who enter 
into a transaction with only limited information about the 
counterpart’s specific attributes.  For economic exchange to take place 
between these types of individuals, generalized or extended trust is 
needed. The importance of this third type of relationship and the 
correspondent economic transactions between largely anonymous 
individuals is a key element of a modern economic system. 
 
This topology suggests that the building of extended trust is a key 
challenge in Iraq’s development to a modern economy. It is also important to 
bear in mind the relationships between the various forms of trust. In particular, 
extended trust could not exist without the experience of reciprocity made in 
repeated interactions among family and other members of a societal or 
business community. Where process based trust is absent, extended trust is 
unlikely to develop.  
 
Moreover, it is unlikely that extended trust in economic exchange could 
be sustained without the availability of third party enforcement by the state. 
Clearly, trust in government institutions will be a necessary prerequisite before 
Iraq can expect any type of significant expansion of the formal economy.  Here 
is where the country’s problems lie. One of the main impediments to a formal 
market in Iraq today is the absence of trust at most levels.  The Ba’athist 
government created a profound imprint on the nature of formal and informal 
institutions in Iraq.  Not only did, Ba’athism hamper the emergence of a market 
economy, it corrupted the judicial and legal institutions needed to create and 
nurture trust.   
 
 In short Iraqi values today are no longer those that were reported in 
earlier accounts of the pre-Ba’athist period, which stressed the country’s 
vibrant entrepreneurial spirit.  Individual and managers’ values have been 
affected by years of repression under authoritarian top-down decision making.  
In an environment of several decades of political and economic insecurity, 
doubt and distrust are deeply entrenched in the individual mind.  They 
represent a major constraint against drawing entrepreneurs and individuals out 
of the safe, kinship-based informal economy.   
 
 One of the main criticisms of U.S. policy in post-war Iraq has been its 
rejection, not only of social reform, but of the very state-centered approaches 
that were critical to the reconstruction and subsequent economic growth in 
post-war Japan and Germany.  At the same time, fundamental social reforms 
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were ruled out.48  As might be expected, combined with the demise of the state 
as a safety net, the lack of trust in the buying and selling of goods and services 
has resulted in the contemporary Iraqi economy being divided into segments of 
largely non-overlapping networks.  
Ascribed Trust Networks 
First and by far the largest in number in Iraq are the individual and 
business networks built on ascribed trust.  These are usually confined to the 
local, informal economy.  Most ascribed trust networks involve groups bound 
together by family, tribal, or ethnicity, which facilitates business organization 
built on oral contracts.  Many of these networks have the potential to expand 
through selective interaction with outsiders.  However, such expansion will take 
time in Iraq, especially under the current conditions of public corruption and 
great uncertainty over the enforceability of contracts. 
 
In today’s Iraq, many ascribed trust activities fall in what is commonly 
referred to as the coping economy -- numerous economic interactions during 
armed conflict that provide benefits to the civilian population, particularly the 
poorest and most vulnerable.  These functions are even more important to 
civilian livelihoods where the formal economy and traditional livelihoods are 
destroyed or rendered difficult or impossible to sustain. The coping economy 
includes a wide range of activities including subsistence agriculture, petty 
trade, and various out of the household businesses – catering, food processing, 
and the like. 
 
Of the country’s three main economic sectors, it is reasonable to assume 
that the coping economy contains a disproportionate share of the country’s 
poverty.  Recent data released by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
indicate that about 5 million Iraqis are living under the poverty line, compared 
with 143,000 in 199349.  Significantly, the Ministry noted that more than one 
million Iraqi women aged 25 to 40 were unmarried, while divorce cases were 
increasing as was child labor.  It is reasonable to assume that this group of 
women is firmly entrenched in the coping economy.  
Process-Based Trust Networks 
Second, there are the process-based trust networks reliant on existing 
ties between the previous members of the Ba'ath government and criminal 
groups – smugglers, etc. — that thrived during the sanctions period of the 
1990s.  Today, these activities are largely in the criminal area.  The emergence 
                                                 
48 Mark Selden, “We Aren’t Close to Doing What We Did in Japan,”  
http://hnn.us./articles/5873.html 
49 “Five Million Iraqis Live Under Poverty Line: Report,” Xinhua News Agency (February 12, 
2004) 
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of pervasive criminality was readily apparent soon after the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein.  
 
If anything, these problems have become increasingly severe.  According 
to a U.N. report, “The emerging crime problem is subtler and scarier: theft, 
extortion, and drug- and arms-smuggling operations that have become more 
sophisticated, more clandestine, and more organized.  In Baghdad, one team of 
thieves recently burned down a warehouse filled with the hot booty of another 
group. It was one mob sending a message to another50”.   
 
 As in the case of the ascribed trust groups, the activities of these 
networks have been affected by the insurgency.  However, process-based 
networks' activities often directly contribute to prolonging the insurgency 
through: 
 
x The destruction or circumvention of the formal economy and the 
growth of informal and black markets, effectively blurring the lines 
between the formal, informal, and criminal sectors and activities; 
 
x Pillage, predation, extortion, and deliberate violence against civilians, 
used by extort ransoms, capture trade networks and diaspora 
remittances, and exploit labor; 
x High decentralization, both in the means of coercion and in the 
means of production and exchange; 
 
x The use of licit or illicit exploitation of trade in lucrative natural 
resources;  
 
x The reliance on cross border trading networks, regional kin and 
ethnic groups, arms traffickers, and mercenaries, as well as legally 
operating commercial entities, each of which may have a vested 
interest in the continuation of conflict and instability. 
 
Scores of the cross-border relationships cultivated by the various 
smuggler/criminal groups in the 1990s are still in place and operational at the 
present time.   Goodhand observes that the shadow economy is frequently 
already widespread before the outbreak of conflict and is a permissive factor 
for conflict when it contributes to violent state collapse.  Or it serves as a 
source of income to would-be-rebels. Once conflict erupts, shadow economies 
are easily captured by combatants and thus often become the basis for the 
combat economy51. This has happened in Iraq, with the current wave of 
                                                 
50 Mark Fritz, “Arms and Drug Smuggling Rise as Crime Gets Organized in the New Iraq,” 
Associated Press, July 5, 2003. 
51 Goodhand, op. cit. 
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kidnappings and smuggling providing significant financial assistance to the 
insurgency52.  
 
Western intelligence agencies are becoming increasingly worried this 
systematic strengthening of ties between terrorists and organized crime. Stefan 
Maier of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs confirmed 
that cooperation between the two camps was on the rise, despite their 
different political and economic motives53.  As he observes: “Common ground 
between terrorists and organized criminal groups can be found primarily in two 
areas. First, the two come together in money-laundering activities: Terrorists 
often need to park their money temporarily with somebody else to cover up 
their tracks. Secondly, they need weapons, and they usually get them straight 
from organized crime54.”   
 
"With the lack of security measures, disorganized crime became 
organized crime," said Hania Mufti, Baghdad director of Human Rights Watch. 
"Then, at some point, there was a merging between organized crime and 
political crime."  
 
In today’s Iraq, terrorist groups use many of the same channels for their 
activities that the Iraqi government and associated criminal groups used in the 
1980s and 1990s.  In this regard, Iraq is an ideal environment. Decades of 
socialist and statist experiments of the Ba’ath Party regime, together with 
subsequent wars and the consequences of UN sanctions, left the Iraqi economy 
heavily damaged, distorted, and exposed to administrative and political 
interference55.  Within this context, terrorists, insurgents, and organized crime 
elements have been able to thrive through exploiting various economic and 
institutional weaknesses. 
Extended Trust Networks 
While extended trust networks may involve some reliance on kinship and 
family relationships, they are largely characterized by transactions between 
largely anonymous individuals.  As noted, they are a key element in a modern 
economic system.  Since the focus of the present analysis is on the informal 
economy, these networks will not be treated in detail other than to note that 
they are largely undeveloped outside the public sector and the national oil 
industry.  Some banking arrangements are moving in this direction, albeit 
extremely slowly.56  
                                                 




55 Robert Looney, “A Return to Ba’thist Economics,” Orient 45:3 (2004), pp. 385-400. 
56 Cf. Robert Looney, “Postwar Iraq’s Financial System,” Middle East Policy, XII:1, Spring 2005. 
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Social capital and its implications for informal activity are summarized in 
Table 5.  Clearly, for Iraq, the key challenge facing the economy is developing 
the conditions conducive to the creation and growth of extended trust 
networks to encourage the growth and development of this type of 
networking.  Conversely, the lack of supporting institutions has constrained 
most economic agents and those entering the labor market to informal 
activities characterized by family/kinship based ascribed trust.  
 
Adding network and labor market conditions to the equation provides 
additional insights to the factors shaping the overall size and, to some extent, 
the composition of Iraq’s contemporary informal economy.  These are 
summarized in Figure 1, with the informal economy seen largely a function of 
fundamental supply and demand factors:  (a) a youth population bulge, (b) a 
long-standing state employment program providing incentives for employment 
in the public, but not private sector, (c) a workforce of diminished skills 
following a long period of sanctions,  (d) little private sector growth stemming 
from the instability and the insurgency following the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein (e) deficient social capital, especially in the form of trust, thus 
confining most private sector transactions to the informal market, and (f) 
openness to trade (neo-liberal reforms) makes many potentially profitable firms 
unprofitable. In turn, the lack of a sizable private sector reduces the links often 
found between the informal and formal economy.   
 
Because the informal economy is largely the result of a convergence of 
powerful long-run demographic and economic forces, it will be a fixture for 
some time to come.  At best, informal activities may evolve over the next 
several years with some progression from ascribed based networks to process 
based networks. If this transition is viewed as successful by Iraqi entrepreneurs 
and the government makes significant strides in the governance area, then the 
progression to process based networks and extended modern networks is a 
distinct possibility, particularly if the security situation stabilizes enough to 
support foreign direct investment.   
 
 However, a good case can be made that under current conditions, the 
development and evolution of organized networks may perpetuate and even 
expand the informal/shadow economies. Many of the organized networks 
today have evolved out of Ba’th party efforts to limit traditional centers of 
tribal authority.  In effect the Ba’th party encouraged the growth and 
proliferation of informal associational links locally.  
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Evolution of Local Networks57 
 More precisely, local-level kinship affiliation was increasingly encouraged 
as the effects of the 1980s war with Iran and the sanctions of the 1990s 
drained the power of the central government. Particularly after the 2001 Gulf 
War, the central government was weakened to the extent that it was unable to 
perform many of its traditional military, economic and security functions.58   
 
 
 The Ba’thist survival strategy during this period was for the party to serve 
as a broad tribal unit local associations performing in supporting roles.  By 
1996 officially sanctioned “tribes” were responsible not only for the 
maintenance of law and order locally, but also collected taxes on behalf of the 
government, were appointed judicial powers and extended tribal customary 
law to the extent of their territorial reach. They received arms and ammunition, 
vehicles, and logistical support as payment for services rendered to the party. 
 
 Local dominance of revived tribal networks was evident in the 1998 crisis 
involving the United States. At that time, heavily armed and equipped Sunni 
tribal units were positioned in and around Baghdad to control the restive urban 
population, a role formerly belonging to the Ba’th party militia. With time the 
interests of the central government and local networks began to diverge.  Clan 
based groups controlled the highways around Baghdad. They increasingly 
turned to criminal activities -- looting, smuggling, and hijacking throughout 
most of al Anbar province.  Conditions deteriorated to the extent that convoys 
were necessary even for basic travel in daylight to avoid raids by tribal guerillas.   
 
 By 2000, policeman, judges, and party officials were subject to violent 
tribal recriminations.  Encounters between Iraqi soldiers and tribal irregulars, 
especially those based in al Anbar province escalated in terms of frequency and 
scale.  In this ever more lawless environment, tribal elements began to take 
over many of the local, informal street-markets. These markets comprised a 
sub-stratum of the informal Iraqi economy that, as noted above, began to 
grow in the early 1980s as a result of chronic resource scarcities brought on by 
war, unrest, and a decade of sanctions.   
 
 In addition, Saddam Hussein’s selective distribution of increasingly scarce 
resources created some of the underlying group rivalries that exist today.  By 
directing funds, rations, government positions, electricity, clean water, fuel and 
industrial investment toward specific villages in the western Sunni regions in 
                                                 
57 This section draws heavily on Nicholas I. Haussler, Third Generation Gangs Revisited: the Iraq 
Insurgency, Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,  September 2005, pp. 33-41. 
58 Excellent accounts of this period is given in: Joseph Braude, The New Iraq (New York: Basic Books, 
2003), and Stephen Glain, Mullahs, Merchants, and Militants: The Economic Collapse of the Arab World 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004), ch. 5. 
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exchange for service to the regime, and withholding resources to other villages 
as a punitive mechanism, a local-level competitive calculus developed that was 
perpetuated by Hussein as in instrument for rule. Because the state-level formal 
economy was dramatically curtailed by sanctions, this competition for 
resources further encouraged the growth of informal activities and 
employment. 
 
 The tendency of corrupt party and state institutions to favor key 
supporters and engage in fraud in the distribution of goods and services 
encouraged those operating in the informal (and formal) economy to rely on 
local level mediation by tribal groups.  Because informal activity is based in 
large part on social capital -- the trusted familial and kinship ties noted above, 
local tribal groups played a central role in the expansion of the informal 
economy.  By assessing fees for the settlement of disputes and collecting taxes 
on local production, local tribal groups also began to establish of financial 
support free of state control. 
 
 Tribal groups were also increasingly involved in criminal-type activities, 
especially in the western border regions.  Illicit criminal networks were initially 
based on the cross-border smuggling of animals, tea, alcohol, and electronics. 
Later these activities began encompassing the drug trade. Tribal based 
organized criminal activities increased toward the end of Ba’thist rule with 
many party members becoming involved due to declining opportunities to 
acquire official resources. By early 2002, the entire route along the Euphrates 
River in Al Anbar had essentially developed into a sanctuary for illicit traffickers 
and criminal entrepreneurs.   
 
 Resource scarcity and the stature of sub-tribal groups were both greatly 
enhanced at the local level following the removal of Saddam Hussein: 
 
x The Coalition Provisional Authority’s CPA early adoption of a neo-
liberal economic program impeded the growth of regulatory and 
legal institutions. This institutional vacuum forced businesses and 
those entering the labor market to rely on the trusted kinship or 
extended family networks of the informal economy. 
 
x Shortages of critical inputs such as electricity and fuel, and the 
dangers of transportation further encouraged informal entrepreneurs 
to rely on tribal and extended family associations for protection and 
support. 
 
x As noted above, endemic corruption and uncertainty have 
contributed to a dramatic increase in the informal sector following 
the 2003 invasion. As a result approximately eighty percent of the 
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labor force is now engaged informally, accounting for nearly two 
thirds of Iraq’s gross domestic product. 
 
x Growth of the informal economy is particularly evident in certain 
areas west of the capital, where the destruction of the Sunni-oriented 
military establishment and related industries has contributed to a 
substantial contraction of formal activities and jobs. 
 
x A principle driver of this growth has been a dramatic rise in criminal 
activity related to he shadow economy and dominated by local-level 
tribal elements, including the emerging economies based on the 
distribution of scarce resources, kidnapping, trafficking in petrol, 
narcotics, looted weaponry, and the targeting of coalition forces. 
 
x In areas beyond the control of the Iraqi government and lacking a 
substantial coalition presence, the shadow economy is rapidly 
displacing any legal or semi-legal structures that may have survived 
until the present. 
 
 The removal of the Hussein regime and the actions of the CPA presented 
a range of opportunities and constraints that have in part determined the 
manner in which street-level groups have mobilized and generated new 
opportunities and constraints for both the original organizations and follow-on 
groups over time.  This evolution has gone through three distinct phases: (1) 
March 2003-December 2003; (2) December 2003-January 2005; and (3) January 
2005 to the present. 
March 2003-December 2003 
 During this initial phase, the persistent lack of security and the policy 
directives issued by the CPA accounted for the greatest opportunities for armed 
groups to expand their positions locally. Within this period the most prominent 
actors at the street-level in term of mobilization potential, organization and 
stature within the surrounding community were those legacy groups of 
local/kinship based “tribal” associations reminiscent of the period under 
sanctions. 
 
 These groups are composed of pre-existing social groups (some former 
regime elements, and perhaps regime opponents) within the tribe that come 
armed and equipped, and they are activated by conflict, inspired leader ship 
and the prospect of loot. 
 
 A second tier of gangs was comprised of those groups engaged in 
entrepreneurial and organized criminal activities, also a legacy of the sanctions. 
These gangs are largely based on local associations.  While there is some 
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degree of overlap between these two tiers the fact that many tribal groups 
maintained militias precisely to protect their local economic interests from 
Ba’th encroachment prevented an alignment between these two groups -- at 
least in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. 
 
 The chaotic lawlessness of this period presented a significant 
opportunity for groups in both tiers to solidify and extend their presence 
locally. Hesitation on the part of coalition forces to manage the deteriorating 
security situation in most urban centers, particularly Baghdad, acted as a 
catalyst in the very process of institutional devolution that had been occurring 
under the Hussein regime. The vacuum that developed in the weeks following 
the invasion increased the scale and intensity of this process as the role of self-
protecting mutual assurance groups responded to the precipitous decline in 
law and order. 
 
 In sum, CPA policies of “de-Bathification,” disbanding of the Iraqi 
national army, and the Coalition’s ambivalence toward the rise of militias 
presented  a second opportunity for street level gangs to expand their influence 
and control of resources. By the closing moths of 2003 the die had been cast. 
December 2003-January 2005 
 Hostilities between coalition troops and local populations, the inability 
of coalition forces to adequately repress insurgent violence, and the return of 
sovereignty to the Iraqi government provided the most significant 
opportunities for the various local networks to expand during this second 
period.  
 
 First, the dominant groups at this stage reflected a three tiered structure.  
The networks corresponding to the two most prominent groups began 
exhibiting a high degree of overlap:   
 
x The combination of tribally-based former security personnel and criminal 
groups comprised the first tier. 
 
x The second and third tiers were occupied by indigenous elements 
motivated by vendetta, and extremist Islamic ideologies, respectively. 
 
x Factors such as the collateral costs of the Fallujah operations and the 
abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib, represented a substantial political 
opportunity by further legitimizing the existence of armed street-level 
groups.  
 
 This environment facilitated the emergence of the second and third tier 
of violent street level actors.  These actors, predominantly foreign in the latter 
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case, were easily absorbed by the expanding networks of street levels groups. 
These groups provided both the means and an added incentive to engage in 
anti-coalition targeting by offering generous monetary incentives.  
 
 This pattern of network evolution was further stimulated by shifting 
budgetary patterns after June 2004 – the time the CPA transferred control of 
government portfolios and the national budget to Iraqi ministries. This shift in 
budgetary authority represented a political opportunity for the street-level 
groups.  Specifically, the allocation of state assets reflected a new budgetary 
dynamic that tended to favor those interests centered in Baghdad over the 
remote provincial areas. As a result, the capacity of the coalition to respond to 
conflict conditions and proceed with reconstructed was seriously weakened. 
 
 Second, newly appointed ministers fostered a climate of parochialism by 
attempting to establish an independent, self-supporting infrastructure within 
the new institutions under their control.  The relationship between the 
Ministries of Interior and Defense is instructive. Both ministries assumed control 
of an array of smaller “special” units comprised of thousands of supporters and 
local affiliates, sustained by diverted funds intended for aid and reconstruction.  
January 2005 to the Present 
 In addition to a continuation of many of the dynamics noted above, this 
period has been marked by a set of new opportunities created by elite 
cleavages within the National Assembly, the increased politicization of militias 
and the continued expansion of the shadow economy. 
 
 Changes in the street level dynamic have been consistent with the 
opportunities for expansion. Again a first-tier of networks exists, possessing a 
high degree of overlap between entrepreneurial and organized criminal 
networks.  They are comprised largely of Iraqis harboring some form of 
vendetta or personal grievance against the coalition. A second tier of actors is 
comprised of foreign and domestic Islamic extremists.   
 
 As in the earlier two periods, demand for weapons, stolen goods, and 
hostages determine the roles and relationships between street-level actors 
more so than ideological or political convictions.  Yet in this phase, 
engagement in the black market has not merely enabled sustained street-level 
activity, it has in many cases become the activity itself, dominating collective 
resources and driving group expansion in terms of capabilities and reach. The 
shift is evident in certain portions of al-Anbar province where despite frequency 
of anti-coalition targeting, criminal endeavors are now thought to account for 
the bulk of street-level activity. Clearly the draw of the shadow economy is a  
major factor tending to decrease the likelihood that Sunni groups will 
participate more in the political process in the near term.   
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 Summing up the evolution of local network development in Iraq, a 
pattern emerges whereby during each phase of the post war period the 
position of locally-oriented armed groups has been solidified and expanded in a 
manner consistent with the type and timing of the political opportunities 
available. The most significant opportunities have included: 
 
x The slow recognition of security conditions facilitated the establishment 
of armed groups in the first phase.  This first phase also represents the 
playing out of the structural conditions stemming from the sanctions 
regime. 
 
x An appreciable shift in the street level dynamic in terms of the relative 
predominance of certain actors in the second and third phases. This 
transition has favored the position of indigenous groups radicalized 
through interaction with the coalition, with a higher degree of overlap 
between all groups and the shadow economy in the current phase.  
 
 State level political openings may lure some elements of resistance into 
the political process, but in the present phase, the draw of the shadow 
economy may be sufficiently strong to keep groups engaged in street-level 
violence. 
Outlines of a Strategy to Combat Insurgent/Criminal Networks 
 Several years have passed since the removal of Saddam Hussein, yet 
there are few indications that the degree of Sunni-led violence will decline.  On 
the contrary, violent activity has increased in frequency and scale over this 
period.   
Mechanisms of Insurgent/Criminal Network Expansion 
 The evolution of local insurgent/criminal networks in Iraq suggests 
several mechanisms that that are consistent with this acceleration of violence. 
One theory -- that associated with the theory of third generation gangs, or the 
3G2 model provides valuable insights as to the manner in which these groups 
are likely to evolve and the best methods to arrest their development.   
 
 Specifically, the 3G2 model suggests that armed groups function within 
a rationally bounded and organized space that is responsive to forces affecting 
the calculus and outcomes of group behavior.  When modified by state 
authorities, these forces represent potential opportunities to minimize, deflect, 
or redirect the activities of the group. 
  
 Many of the structural conditions found in Iraq are key constructs of the 
3G2 model.  In particular, the existence of violent networks in the context of a 
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state that is constrained by minimal capacity, poor economic performance, and 
significant social and political disparities are key elements of the model. The 
3G2 model also assumes that self-protecting solidarity groups are heavily 
engaged in the informal and criminal economies at the local level.  
Insurgent/criminal networks in Iraq are analogous to the form and functions 
performed by street-level gangs -- the basic element of the 3G2 concept. 
 
 As the 3G2 model would predict, insurgent and criminal groups in Iraq 
have expanded their economic and political positions vis a vis the state through 
corruption and intimidation. Further the model posits that 3G2 actors 
themselves initiate this process for the purpose of establishing lawless areas 
and criminal enclaves or quasi-states.   
 
 On the other hand, certain causal relationships in Iraq differ from those 
posited by the 3G2 approach.  In particular roles of local networks and the 
state are reversed.   Starting with Saddam in the 1980s, the incremental decline 
of the capacity and presence of the Iraqi state, combined with the sate-initiated 
scheme to retain power facilitated the expanded role the role of local-level 
groups. In fact, Saddam’s approach during austere times was to compel local 
groups to fill the political and security vacuum produced by institutional 
retrenchment.   
 
 The process continued after Saddam’s fall – nearly all of the available 
political space with the exception of state-level ministerial portfolios had been 
effectively abandoned to local forces. In Iraq, the extent of corruption and 
intimidation exercised by insurgent and criminal groups has resulted from state 
retreat. As normally constructed the 3G2 model assumes criminal networks 
encroaching on the state.   
 
 The Iraq case suggests several modifications of the 3G2 model are 
necessary to better understand the dynamics unfolding in that country.  In 
particular  the end-state of the dynamic group processes currently underway 
are groups of lawless criminal enclaves or quasi-states stemming from the 
state’s inability to provide essential social, economic and security functions.  
 
 On the other hand the present system may exhibit some stability. As the 
quasi-states take on the local functions of providing security and access to 
resources, they tend to favor a certain degree of stability and ever-increasing 
levels of market access.  The competitive dynamic between these quasi states 
may produce a status quo that preserves the structure of the declining state.  
The state structure persists not in spite of the proliferation of quasi-states but 
precisely as a result of this process.  This dynamic may explain some of the 
stability and security in Iraq in the absence of effective national government. 
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Oil and the Insurgency 
 A number of these mechanisms can be illustrated by the well 
documented patterns of interaction between the oil sector, government 
officials and the insurgency.59 
 
 As noted above, oil smuggling became endemic in the 1990s when 
resource scarcity combined with government corruption combined to produce 
vast smuggling networks.  The black market thrived, and informal business 
networks grew. Between 1991 and 2002, Iraq smuggled nearly 900 million 
barrels; between 1997 and 2003, Saddam's regime reaped more than $8 billion 
in illicit oil sales. 
 
 During this period and despite enmity between their governments, oil 
smuggling networks grew between Iraq and both Syria and Iran, which 
continue to this day. Both governments benefited. The Iraqi government found 
a market in which it could bypass U.N. demands to spend revenue on 
humanitarian projects while the Iranian and Syrian regimes found both a cheap 
source of fuel and kickback income. The Pentagon estimated in 2000 that of 
the $205 per metric ton cost for smuggled Iraqi oil in the Persian Gulf, $95 
went back to the Iraqi government; $50 went to the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corp's navy while the smugglers kept the remainder. 
 
 There was no shortage of market for smuggled oil. The official, 
government-controlled State Oil Marketing Company (SOMO) opened offices in 
Jordan and struck agreements with the governments of Iran, Lebanon, and the 
United Arab Emirates to facilitate oil sales. Buyers included organized crime 
networks from Somalia, Pakistan, and India, as well as brokers purchasing oil 
for coalition naval vessels patrolling in the Persian Gulf and enforcing the 
sanctions. 
 
 Smuggling networks persisted into the post-Saddam period. Rather than 
disrupt the network, the collapse of Saddam's government only drove it 
underground. The failure to install metering systems on oil flow facilitated 
corruption. Absent such metering, the real amount of crude oil either exported 
or smuggled remains subject to speculation. 
 
 The security vacuum following Iraqi liberation further bolstered 
opportunities not only for the existing smuggling networks but also for new 
criminal gangs. Just as Saddam used oil revenue to finance violence against the 
Iraqi people, so too have insurgents. Open borders facilitated smuggling, 
especially along the sparsely-populated Iraqi-Syrian frontier.  
 
                                                 
59 The following draws heavily on Robert Looney, The Business of Insurgency, op. cit., and Bilal A. 
Wahab, “How Iraqi Oil Smuggling Greases Violence,” Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2006. 
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 Several well documented cases illustrate the complex interrelationship 
between government officials, criminal gangs and the insurgence.  In one 
notable case, the new Iraqi government signed (July 26, 2004) a deal to export 
crude oil to Syria in exchange for oil products. Over a three-week period in April 
2006, Iraqi police seized 400,000 barrels of crude oil that was being smuggled 
into Syria. Within twenty-four hours, police at the Rabiyah border crossing 
confiscated 1,200 smuggling tanker trunks whose drivers carried forged 
documents. The scale of smuggling suggests the complicity of both Syrian and 
Iraqi government officials. Dawud al-Baghistani, head of the Commission on 
Public Integrity in Mosul, told reporters that while the ring was connected to 
insurgents, the parties involved in the Rabiyah smuggling included officials 
from customs and the ministries of oil, interior, and finance, as well as some 
private companies.  
 
 In another case demonstrating the confluence of officials, oil smuggling, 
and the insurgency, insurgents bribed government officials in order to access 
oil routes. Hazem al-Shaalan, who served as defense minister during the interim 
administration of Ayad Allawi, tasked Mish'an al-Juburi, a former 
parliamentarian and leader of an influential tribe in Iraq, to secure oil pipelines 
between Baiji and Kirkuk, an area which falls within the Al-Juburi tribal 
territory. Subsequently, Juburi was indicted for theft of several million U.S. 
dollars. Iraqi officials also suspect that he knowingly hired insurgents to 
infiltrate oil pipeline protection forces and shared profits with the 
insurgents.[20] It appears likely that Juburi, insurgents, or both bribed Shaalan 
to offer the original contract.  
 
 The profits insurgents reap from the oil trade are significant. Some 
estimate that insurgents pocket 40 to 50 percent of oil smuggling-generated 
revenue. Given an environment of high unemployment, low salaries, 
kidnappings, and murder, many Iraqis turn to the illicit economy to supplement 
income and provide for their families. In the absence of functional law 
enforcement, lucrative oil smuggling has replaced many small businesses. 
 
 Corruption has also compromised Basra, Iraq's second largest city and 
southern hub. Close to the Rumayla oil fields and linked by the Shatt al-Arab 
waterway to the Persian Gulf, it is a natural outlet for smuggling. A chief node 
in Saddam's oil smuggling operations, oil smuggling in Basra has only grown 
more overt since his fall.  
 
 The rivalry among various Shi‘ite parties has compounded the problem. 
The Fadhila Party controls the governor's office as well as the oil industry in 
Basra. When new prime minister Nuri al-Maliki decided not to give the oil 
ministry to the Fadhila party when he announced his new cabinet in May 2006, 
the party threatened to stop oil exports. Had they not received benefits from 
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their position, such drastic action would be unnecessary. A senior Iraqi oil 
official said that Fadhila sought kickbacks, and he blamed the unrest in Basra 
on the corruption and "power struggle between militias and mafias" within the 
ruling Shi‘ite coalition. 
 
 Iraq's economy takes a second hit when Iraq buys refined oil. Because 
Iraq sells the imported fuel with huge subsidies, much of the refined product is 
exported back to the refining countries. The Oil Ministry's inspector general 
gave an example: throughout 2005, the Iraqi government has been selling 
diesel at the subsidized price of less than three cents a gallon, which could be 
sold for at least a dollar a gallon on the black market. Hence, a smuggler 
bringing fuel in a 9000-gallon truck from a neighboring country could make as 
much as $7,450 even after paying generous bribes. Because the pipelines in no 
way benefit the insurgents, the lines have frequently been attacked to force the 
government to rely on trucks—a business already controlled by smugglers. 
Smuggling in fuel may have cost Iraq between $2.5 billion and $4 billion in 
2005 alone. 
 
 The exploitation and diversion of oil resources hurts Iraq's economic, 
social, and political development. Oil smuggling places an enormous burden on 
state revenue and Iraq's economy. Up to 30 percent of Iraq's imported gasoline 
has been lost to smuggling networks, half of which is pocketed by the Iraqi 
insurgency. Had the Iraqi government invested this lost revenue in refineries, it 
might not need to import 60 percent of its refined oil needs. Not only have 
funds for vital projects been lost, but a portion of the missing revenue helps 
fund insurgency. Terrorism, in turn, hampers foreign investment. Attacking the 
oil pipelines could be a criminal enterprise but, regardless, insurgents benefit 
by extorting protection money from oil trucks. Terrorists and criminals have 
established a dangerous symbiosis. All these developments perpetuate 
instability and violence in Iraq.  
 
 How, then, can the Iraqi government break this cycle? First, the 
government needs to secure its borders. While the Coalition Provisional 
Authority and subsequent Iraqi governments have hired 22,000 border guards 
since 2003, this level is still below that needed to ensure security. Competence 
must also supplant sectarian, tribal, and political patronage. 
 
 While the Iraqi government, as demanded by the International Monetary 
Fund, has taken steps to lessen its subsidies, the continued discrepancy 
between the price of oil in Iraq and in neighboring countries provides the 
financial incentive for smuggling. 
 
 Maliki's government must also tackle the problem of bribery. Corruption 
permeates the Iraqi government from the top echelon of ministers to tribal 
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chieftains and border patrol officers. Often, officials are the smugglers and are 
fully involved in the operation. If the new government can control bribery, then 
the incentive to turn a blind eye disappears at multiple points in the smuggling 
process. 
 
 While problems associated with subsidies and oil industry corruption 
may seem mundane amidst continued kidnapping and car bombs, until U.S. 
and Iraqi authorities manage to constrain Iraqi oil smuggling, violent crime and 
insurgency will continue to flourish. 
State Decline – Criminal/Insurgent Expansion 
 In sum, despite the reverse causation between state decline and 
criminal/insurgent network expansion, many of the principals of the 3G2 
concept are largely consistent with developments in Iraq. What do the 
modifications to the 3G2 for the Iraq situation suggest for that country’s 
future?  
 
x First, insurgent-group activity can be viewed as a cumulative effect of 
the structural forces prevalent in Iraq.  The choice to engage in violence 
is one element of a strategic rational formed by conditions of scarcity 
and the functions armed groups performs locally.  This rationale also 
shapes the competitive dynamic that drives political and economic 
expansion. 
 
x Second, the behavior of locally-based armed groups can be affected by 
manipulating societal and local-level factors, the most significant of 
which are: (a) economic conditions especially the growth of the informal 
economy, (b) competition between entrepreneurial and 
criminal/insurgent networks linked to the informal/shadow economies, 
and (c) the openness of the legitimate political sphere. 
 
x Finally, these and other inputs into the 3G2 framework can be expected 
to generate certain outcomes stemming from group/network evolution 
from the street level. 
 
 The acceleration in violence in Iraq throughout most of 2006 suggests 
that the informal and shadow sectors will continue to dominate the economic 
landscape in the near term and will likely grow as the markets associated with 
insurgent violence expand. The criminal economies based on theft, weapons 
trading, mercenary kidnappings, black-market smuggling and arbitrage that 
have become the cornerstone of insurgent mobilization will continue to 
operate with very few constraints and will likely increase in proportion to 
increasing levels of violence. 
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 In the current phase, competition is actually fueling the expansion of the 
underground economy in addition to the increased appropriation of market 
segments by combatants.  When viewed in the context of the 3G2 model, the 
structural setting presently observed in Iraq suggests the continuous and 
unconstrained expansion of insurgent group capabilities well into the future: 
 
1. The tendency of insurgent groups to capture sectors of the growing 
informal and criminal economies will increase.  This in combination with 
the growing political stature of armed groups and a liberalizing Iraqi 
state favors some type of criminal enclavization or quasi-state 
development in parallel to legitimate state structures. 
 
2. Armed groups will function as the shadow or de-facto governments 
within these enclaves providing the services and performing the tasks 
reflective of their local orientation. 
 
3. The structure of the legitimate Iraqi state will survive and may even 
thrive in those areas outside insurgent influence. 
 
4. Locally-oriented armed groups can be expected to expand from the 
street to the sub-national level, evolving from mutually protective 
solidarity groups into prominent political and economic actors. 
 
 The degree of intensity of insurgent violence is increasing and this trend 
is likely to continue. Coalition forces confronting this challenge have been 
thrust into an environment of great uncertainty.  Coalition forces on the 
ground are facing a variety of threats from across the spectrum of violent 
actors.  The different motivations and relationships between these groups are 
gradually emerging: 
 
x Indigenous and transnational actors are establishing links and 
magnifying their capabilities in ways that are consistent with the rapidly 
changing information-age environment. 
 
x The traditional distinctions between violent groups seeking political 
goals and those pursuing profit are becoming blurred. 
 
 Summing up, an adapted version of the 3G2 model provides useful 
insights into the Sunni-led insurgency that the general guidelines currently in 
use tend to overlook.  Those guidelines depict the insurgent threat as a discrete 
collection of actors motivated by a combination of nihilistic range, primordial 
tribal grievances or a desire to restore the former grandeur of the Ba’th party. 
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 In contrast, the 3G2 model identifies the societal-level conditions 
affecting the origins, development and orientation of armed groups, the 
political role that these groups embrace over time and the relationships 
between groups that span the local, regal and global levels of interactions. 
 
 These factors culminate most forcefully at the street level, where the 
relationships between groups are characterized by violence and competition.  
The integrated model highlights certain critical junctures where these 
relationships can be altered and exploited to better combat the insurgency.. 
Strategies to Reduce Insurgent Violence 
 The integrated model shows that insurgent-group activity can be viewed 
as part of the continued effects of the structural forces prevalent in Iraq.  The 
choice to engage in violence is one element of a strategic rationale informed by 
conditions of scarcity and the functions armed groups perform locally.  This 
rationale also shapes the competitive dynamic that drives the expansion of 
insurgent groups into the political and economic realms.  Therefore the 
behavior of locally-based groups can be affected by manipulating societal and 
local-level factors, the most significant of which are the size and composition of 
the underground/shadow economy and the openness of the legitimate political 
sphere.  These areas comprise the key vulnerabilities of the insurgent/criminal 
groups in Iraq: 
 
 Resolving critical shortages and introducing balanced reforms in the 
formal sector will slow or reverse the growth of the informal and shadow 
economies.  These measures would significantly undercut street level 
mobilization structures by co-opting the functions of tribal and sub-tribal 
groups wile diminishing the pull of the shadow economy which fuels insurgent 
activity 
 
 Openness at the political level would similarly undercut or co-opt the 
rising political stature of armed leaders by channeling them into a legitimate 
political process.   
 
 Clearly, greater emphasis should be placed on limiting the growth of the 
informal and criminal economies, which are easily captured by 
criminal/insurgent networks.  As noted above, Iraq’s present set of economic 
policies are legacies of the CPA period.  As in many other developing countries, 
they were intended to produce a thriving, free market economy. These policies 
reflect much of the reform agenda commonly known as the Washington 
Consensus, emphasizing fiscal discipline, re-prioritization of public 
expenditures, privatization, trade liberalization, deregulation, foreign direct 
investment, property rights and good governance in general. 
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 Three years later many of these reforms are only partially or haphazardly 
in place, contributing the expansion of the vibrant informal and shadow 
economies at the expense of formal sector development. One course of action 
is to try and press ahead with the completion of market reforms.  However, 
given the current political atmosphere in Baghdad with so many government 
officials having a vested interest in preserving their lucrative links to black 
markets and the underground economy, this is unlikely to occur until major 
strides are made toward controlling corruption.  Even price reforms will take 
time to begin slowing the growth of the underground markets.  For example, 
while gas prices are gradually rising as part of an International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) program60, the impact on the shadow economy has been somewhat due 
to the still prevalent oil price differential between Iraq and its neighbors.   
 
 Another approach is to re-introduce many of the pre-2003 state-based 
social services with emphasis placed on slowing or reversing the impetus to join 
the informal and shadow economies. Thee measures would significantly 
undercut street-level mobilization structures by co-opting the functions of tribal 
and sub-tribal groups while diminishing the pull of the shadow economy which 
fuels insurgent activity. 
 
 A variant on this course of action would be the reorientation of 
economic programs from the post-war centralized top-down orientation 
toward one that is decentralized and inclusive. This reorientation is likely to 
erode somewhat the popular or at least passive support for the insurgency – 
the more people with a stake in the decision making process and economic 
outcomes, the greater included in the decision making process. 
 
As things stand in Iraq, many Coalition programs are not having much of 
an impact at the household level. The neoliberal reforms noted above are a top-
town approach towards the economy, with often little trickling down.  On the 
other hand many infrastructure projects carried out are not necessarily the ones 
the Iraqis themselves would have opted for given a significant input into the 
decision making process.  While some employment is created by these projects 
none are really the part of an overriding development strategy geared to 
meeting specific objectives that the Iraqis themselves would have necessarily 
opted for.   
 
In other words, there is a large disconnect with what goes on at the 
macro levels and at the project level.  Part of this stems from the fact that the 
country has no real development strategy – documents abound, but none of 
these approaches the country’s economic recovery and growth in a systematic, 
integrated manner.  As result and because the Iraqis have had very little 
significant input into the process it is not clear that existing or proposed 
                                                 
60 Robert Looney, “The IMF’s Return to Iraq,” Challenge 49:3, May/June 2006. 
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programs are efficient in any meaningful way in meeting the average citizen’s 
needs. For this reason many Iraqis feel alienated with little stake in the current 
system.  The indirect stimulus from the neoliberal reforms is not impacting on 
their lives and the direct impact stemming from individual reconstruction 
projects is not sufficient to make significant impacts on their standards of 
living.   
 
With these general guidelines in mind, it is possible to sketch out a 
economic development strategy in a manner consistent with the generation of 
equitable, sustained growth?  If so what role might the Marines play at the 
local level? Briefly, three aspects of the reform program are critical:   
 
 First the strategy will have to incorporate the factors noted above that 
are likely to undermine insurgent/criminal groups in Iraq.  Failure to do so will 
leave many local areas in the grips of violence, undermining any positive gains 
made in the economic/social areas.  If the underlying determinants of the 
insurgency/criminal activities are not addressed and eliminated, programs in 
the economic/social/political area however well designed are doomed to failure.  
 
Second, is there a credible approach that addresses the main deficiencies 
of neoliberalism?    While the conventional wisdom at the beginning of the 
1990s was that no credible alternative existed, that is no longer the case. Much 
of the current thinking on the factors needed for a successful development 
strategy come out of the experience of the Transition countries in the 1990s.  
The experience of transition shows that the neoliberal policies of liberalization, 
stabilization and privatization that are not grounded in adequate institutions 
may not deliver successful outcomes. As Professor Roland notes: 
 
Thus there has been a shift in emphasis from markets and price theory to 
contracting and to the legal, social and political environment of 
contracting. Transition has not only helped to reinforce this change of 
focus in economic thinking, it has also renewed interest in thinking 
about the interplay and complementarities between the various 
constitutive institutions of capitalism. Finally, transition has forced us to 
think about institutions not in a static way, but in a dynamic way: how 
momentum for reform is created, how institutions can evolve but also 
how momentum can be lost, and how one can get stuck in inefficient 
institutions. In this sense, transition has reinforced what I would call the 
evolutionary-institutionalist perspective, insisting both on the 
environment of agents at any moment in time but also in its evolutions. 
61 
 
                                                 
61 Gerard Roland, “Ten Years After…Transition Economics,” IMF Staff Papers 48 (2001), pp. 29-52. 
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In Iraq’s case, the most important differences between the two 
paradigms are no doubt related to their flexibility in adapting to unanticipated 
developments. For the Neoliberal approach, the political economy emphasis is, 
as was the case, in Iraq in 2003 to use early windows of opportunity of periods 
of “exceptional politics” to push reforms through as fast as possible and to 
create irreversibility. 62  
 
The new institutionalists view this strategy as dangerous locking 
countries while countries in into inefficient economic structures that are hard 
to reverse because of the irreversibilities created.  The emphasis is rather on 
ensuring a continuous and growing support for reforms among the population. 
This implies a more gradual and experimental approach to reforms, relying on 
the flexibility of experimentation with an adequate sequencing of reforms to 
possibly reverse reforms that do not work and try other ones. 63 
 
Certainly a shift from the neoliberal paradigm to the new institutionalist 
model of development is called for in Iraq.  However, given the large number of 
degrees of freedom, it makes the most sense at this point in time to simply 
sketch out a broad approach to reform. The presumption is that within this 
framework there is ample scope for modification, and while some measures 
might improve the likelihood of a liberal market economy eventually thriving in 
the country, implementing the complete set of actions is not critical in this 
regard. Instead, given the security situation and desire to combat the pull of 
extremists it is better to focus on a few high impact policies. 
 
Third and building upon the new institutionalist model, Iraq’s strategy 
will have to be one that is capable of creating a virtuous circle, with progress in 
one area creating incentives/pressure for progress in other areas.  In short, 
economic programs, projects and reforms will have to be designed capable of 
creating sufficient momentum to overcome the physical, economic, 
demographic, networking and political impediments to growth.  Here, 
corruption and the stake many have in maintaining the current system are 
particular obstacles. As long as the current set of reforms remain stalled, the 
more entrenched those opposing reforms will become.  
 
Fourth, the various elements of the development strategy must interact 
as a coherent whole with each element reinforcing the others.  Several key 
supporting elements stand out: (1) local financing trough the creation of a 
series of microfinance institutions;  (2) a dual-track strategy that focuses on 
both the development of the formal economy and the contraction of the 
informal segments of economic activity, (3) the reorientation of reconstruction 
                                                 
62 Gerard Roland, “Ten Years After…Transition Economics,” IMF Staff Papers 48 (2001), pp. 29-52. 
63 Ibid. 
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towards community development and (4) a reorganization of aid programs 
toward grants and rapid impact on the local community.  
 
Fifth, implementation will no doubt be greatly assisted if several existing 
proven programs are expanded: 64 
The Local Governance Project (LGP) 
The LGP program represents an ambitious attempt at establishing 
democratic governance in Iraq. Specifically, the program’s goal is the 
establishment of local institutions that are representative, responsive and 
capable of addressing citizens’ needs and desires.  To this end, the creation of 
social capital — the creation of links across different social, religious and ethnic 
groups is also a major objective of this program.   
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) 
The purpose of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) 
is to provide commanders with a means to respond to urgent humanitarian 
relief and reconstruction assistance that can be implemented quickly and have 
an immediate impact on the Iraqi people. 65 This is a creative and important 
program designed to provide U.S. governmental appropriations directly to 
tactical units for the purpose of meeting emergency needs of local Iraqi civilians 
(a similar program exists in Afghanistan).   
 
With most projects averaging $50,000 CERP provides a quick and 
effective method that provides immediate, positive impact on the Iraqi people, 
while other larger reconstruction projects are still getting off the ground. The 
key to project selection is:  (1) execute quickly; (2) employ many Iraqis; (3) 
benefit the Iraqi people and (4) may be highly visible. 66   
 
CERP money can be used to meet various needs, including supplies, 
additions, to schools, clean-up projects, medical equipment, street lights, water 
towers and general reconstruction. Typical of the CERP program are: (a) 78 
projects in the north district funded for $4.9 million will add three classrooms 
each to 27 schools and six classrooms apiece to 51 schools; (b) in the Gulf 
Region Central District, an $89,000 outpatient clinic is being built. Also in the 
central district, seven CERP projects for a cost of $1.4 million are scheduled to 
replace low- and medium-voltage lines through Sadr City.67  
                                                 
64 Thanks to LtCol John P Boland (CE G5 G&E Econ Officer) for providing valuable insights and the basic 
documents pertaining to the current situation in Iraq.  
65 CERP Family of Funds: Fiscal Policies, Processes, and Standard Operating Procedures 
(Baghdad: Multinational Corps-Iraq, June 29, 2005), p. 2. 
66 Ibid,  p. 4. 
67 “Construction Program Pumps Millions of Dollars into Iraqi Life,” Nooz.com (July 27, 2005). 
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Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) 
OTI’s strategic objective, “political transition successfully advanced in 
priority, conflict-prone countries,” is the basis for the short-term, flexible 
and rapid assistance it provides in transitional settings. OTI’s support during 
transitions to peace and democracy and transitional political crisis has the 
potential to help create a strong foundation for longer-term targeted 
development programs. This program has been greatly under-funded, yet 
has the potential to play a critical role in Iraq, especially if it is closely 
coordinated with the in conjunction with LGP programs and the CERP. 
 
 Summarizing the proposed strategy: 
 
1. Shifting from a neoliberal/Washington Consensus development strategy 
to one along neo-institutionalist lines as done in several of the Transition 
countries would reorient the development process in a manner 
encompassing more groups into the country’s decision making and 
development process.  
 
2. In contrast the neoliberal approach of relying on a whole spectrum of 
reforms, the neoliberal approach would shift attention to certain key 
areas critical to the building up of a momentum for further reforms. 
  
3. Instead of the neoliberal stress on liberalization, stabilization and 
privatization, the evolutionary approach focuses on creating the 
institutional underpinnings of markets needed to insure strong 
entrepreneurial development.  
 
4. While the neoliberal approach has focused on creating a clean slate by 
breaking up existing state structure, the institutional approach would 
attempt to use existing institutions to prevent further economic 
disruption and social unrest while developing new institutions. 
 
5. A community development based development strategy fits into this 
general framework enabling Iraqis to participate in designing programs 
and policies in tune with their direct needs.  The result would be better 
project selection, completion, and satisfaction, lessening the pull of 
extremist groups.68  
 
6. The community based strategy should be focused not just on deriving 
local development plans to be funded through redirected aid allocations. 
A key element of this strategy is to gradually repair the social capital 
                                                 
68 The rational for a community development oriented approach has been developed by  Jason 
Ben-Meier. See his “Create a New Era of Islamic-Western Relations by Supporting Community 
Development,” Strategic Insights III:4 (April 2004). 
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linkages destroyed by the previous regime. Starting at the local level and 
expanding to the region and eventually the national level, networks 
would strengthen not only the workings of the economic system, but 
also assist in the creation of a viable Iraqi state. 
 
7. In shifting towards a community development based strategy, programs 
at the local level should build on three highly successful programs, but 
to date vastly under-funded: (a) the Commanders Emergency Response 
Program (CERP), (b) the Local Governance Project (LGP) and Office of 
Transition Initiatives (OTI).  
 
8. These three programs have largely operated independently, but should 
be closely coordinated and their orientation (mainly CERP) expanded to 
allow the funding of private sector projects. There is some evidence that 
there has been an over expansion in certain areas – schools, and other 
public sector activities.  At this time the biggest impact per dollar will 
come from assisting the establishment of private, labor-intensive start up 
companies. 
  
9. Distributing a certain percentage of oil revenues to the Iraqi public 
through the creation of an oil fund, would provide added demand for a 
wide range of domestic consumer goods. Part of this payment to Iraqis 
could be made conditional on participation in local clean-up programs 
while short-term training programs were providing the skills needed by 
private companies. 
 
10. A Development Bank should be established, and funded by an additional 
share of oil revenues. This would be a temporary to allow time for the 
commercial banking system to gain the expertise to eventually perform 
this function. The bank would specialize in small loans to start-up 
companies, encouraging the participation of women in the economy.  
 
11. A goal of the newly created Development Bank would be regional 
balance with lending oriented toward a fairly even distribution of new 
firms across the country. 
 
12. Within this context, the shift to a dual track development strategy with a 
focus on supporting small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) would 
draw many entrepreneurs out of the informal sector, further assisting in 
the creation of new firms and associated employment.  
 
13. Two areas of governance are critical for the private sector to take hold 
and thrive in Iraq: secure property rights and an improved rule of law. In 
the past deterioration in the rule of law and related institutional 
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enforcement mechanisms has shifted the balance of incentives toward 
participation in the informal economy. 
 
14. Improved macroeconomic stability will be critical in providing the right 
price incentives for private sector investment and activity. With growth 
inflationary pressures, the government will need to develop an improved 
stabilization tools, perhaps starting with an oil stabilization fund to 
better smooth out expenditures, avoiding short run bursts of disruptive 
austerity measures. 
 
15. In Iraq’s case, large allocations of assistance should be directed to two 
key areas noted above – small scale enterprise development and 
community development. Particularly in the case of community 
development the use of grants should be seriously considered.  As the 
Meltzer commission observed, this provides a more effective means of 
monitoring projects and providing incentives to recipients.   
 
16. Progress, as judged by annual independent audit, of stipulated outputs. 
This and other safe-guards might also help assure that community 
programs would not be taken over or reoriented by extremist groups. 
 
17. Once the process is underway, several links between added employment 
and further demand creation would reinforce in a virtuous cycle-type 
mechanism the employment creation capability of the economy.  
 
18. Most importantly, with the creation and expansion of a new class of 
entrepreneurs and those with a stake in seeing the reform process move 
ahead. 
 
19. Further reforms, the reduction of corruption and the creation of and 
expansion of extended networks would build up the momentum to 
hopefully assure the viability and continuance of a liberal market 
economy. 
  
 Within this general strategy, a number of guidelines for Marine 
economic and reconstruction activities in Iraq  become apparent:69 
 
 1. Treat aid and economic development as short-term operational 
necessities until sufficient security and stability exist to give workable priority to 
longer-term efforts.  Trying to build on longer term and more ambitions goals 
without a functioning short term foundation will simply lead to waste and 
failure. In economic terms this implies a very high time discount and may mean 
                                                 
69 Based on Anthony Cordesman, “The Importance of building Local Capabilities: Lessons from the 
Counterinsurgency in Iraq,”  Draft, CSIS August 1, 2006, pp. 21-23. 
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sacrificing projects with potentially higher long-term rate of returns, for 
activities that may never contribute significantly to longer term growth.   
 
 2. Give top priority to local jobs, local services, and efforts with 
immediate visibility and targeted impact on the local populace.  Aid and 
development must actually benefit ordinary people directly, make the local 
government seem useful and credible, and show people that the US is actually 
helping.  In stability operations and any form of conflict, perception will be as 
important as performance. 
 
 3. Focus on sustaining and expanding key sources of government 
revenue.  Iraq and Afghanistan are scarcely dew demonstrations of the fact 
that planning local forces and stability efforts that cannot be financially 
sustained by the host country rapidly develop serious problems in distorting the 
local economy and operations of the government. They also show in very 
different ways the need to rapidly help local governments develop or protect 
their sources of revenues. 
 
 4. Do not count on donor conferences and third party pledges of aid.  
Efforts to seek allied and international aid can be useful, but produce far more 
pledges and aid with strings attached than actual results and inevitably fall 
short of the requirement.  The US must plan to pay for the aid efforts necessary 
to succeed. 
 
 5. Do not attempt ambitious efforts to restructure infrastructure unless 
these can be managed and implemented at the local level.  The task will be to 
meet local expectations as much as possible on local terms and to avoid 
creating unrealistic demands and expectations. Small or medium sized efforts 
to fix and improve existing capabilities will go a long way toward building 
positive expectations and confidence in the local population. 
 
 6. Do not attempt to remake the national economy in mid crisis or 
wartime and only attempt major structural or sectorial change if the local 
government and people want it and can clearly sustain it.  The US lacks the 
core competence to do this.  It places an impossible burden on US forces and 
on the entire US mission and creates major new problems for local leaders. 
 
 7. Let local governments take the lead and make their own mistakes: 
Focus on reviewing and vetting requests for aid and ensuring they have suitable 
monitoring and fiscal controls.  Iraq is only one of many case studies that show 
that the US is no better than local authorities at trying to undertake such large 
scale efforts and that the moment the US takes responsibility, it not only 
acquires the blame but finds it progressively harder to transfer responsibility 
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back.  By contrast advising, vetting, demanding suitable accounting and 
demanding measure of progress can be highly effective. 
 
 8. Do not rely on or use US contractors or other outside contractors 
unless absolutely necessary and by exception.  The purpose of operations at 
both the political and economic levels will be to win local support and 
strengthen local capabilities.  It will also be to get maximum operational 
benefits from the funds involved, and these will be heavily dependent on local 
employment and on the perception and the reality that aid efforts and projects 
meet local needs. 
 
 9. Provide US, allied, or local military security or do not attempt the 
effort; do not use mercenaries or private security details (PSDs) again.  If the US 
is to commit major resources to stability operations, nation building and 
counterinsurgency, it must commit military forces to protect them, provide 
transportation, and provide support in high risk areas. 
 
 10. Accept the fact that some level of waste and corruption is inevitable 
and that meeting urgent needs on local terms has the higher priority. Bringing 
waste and corruption under reasonable control in necessary.  Setting US 
standards, and giving anti-corruption and similar measures the same priority as 
success is absurd.  Quite aside from the pressures and uncertainties of war and 
crisis, local standards of honesty and efficiency have to be accepted. 
 
Taken as a whole these policy initiatives have the potential of not only 
significantly expanding domestic employment opportunities, but perhaps more 
importantly doing so through the creation of a virtuous cycle with feedbacks 
between the domestic market, further reforms and the labor markets (Figure 
3).   
 
Community development programs should be started and greatly 
expanded in those areas security permitting.70  Local participation, project 
identification and implementation are the most rapid way to attack the current 
unemployment problems while reducing the insurgency threat.  Iraqis must feel 
they have a real stake in the future and that it is within their control. 
 
In terms of timing, the first priority should be to expand and build on 
existing, successful programs.  While a number of these programs exist, the 
CERP program stands out and should have a significant increase in its funding.  
There is a growing consensus that if this program had had more funding all 
along we would not be in the mess we are now.  The program should be 
                                                 
70 The more than 200 Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) in Iraq have a constructive role to 
play in these situations. Cf. “Iraq: New Local NGOs Set to Play a Greater Role,” (New York: 
United Nations, March 25, 2004).  
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modified slightly to assure its support of overall community development 
programs. In addition, expanding CERP’s scope to include the funding of 
private sector ventures would probably be the quickest way to obtain an 
immediate impact on Iraqi jobs and incomes.  The capability exists in CERP for 
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Second, the other two programs mentioned above, LGP and OTI, should 
also be greatly expanded and their efforts coordinated with the CERP. There 
has been a natural tendency for LGP and OTI programs to be absent from areas 
where security is an issue.  Teaming them up with CERP is one way of 
extending their presence to areas of potentially high impact. The close 
coordination of these two programs with CERP could provide the needed 
security for the continuity needed to develop and implement quick action 
Rough Draft – Comments Welcome 
48 of 49 
programs meeting the needs of the average Iraqi. However, the joining of 
forces of CERP, LGP, and OTI is not a natural one and will require some 
creativity in focusing the strengths of each on a common course of action – 
results will easily justify the effort. 
 
Third, work is underway concerning the rule of law and property rights. 
This should be given a higher priority and additional resources for speedy 
resolution. The remainder of the programs noted above – Development Bank, 
Oil Fund, Dual Development/Informal economy credit programs can be 
gradually phased in as funding and personnel permit. They are needed 
programs to sustain the momentum built up by expanded CERP, LGP and OTI 
efforts.  
 
In sum, the strategy outlined above have the potential of  fulfilling the 
six overall conclusions  of a recent Rand study concerning the effectiveness of 
social and economic development in countering terrorism recruitment71: (a) 
Social and economic policies can weaken local support; and (b) Social and 
economic development can discourage terrorist recruits. However, the Rand 
report goes on to caution that:  
 
1. Social and economic policies inhibit terrorism only when they are 
funded adequately. As noted above, CERP allocations have been vastly 
undefended. Not only will the scope of CERP have to be expanded to 
include loans to the private sector, but its budget expanded to 
adequately meet local needs.  
 
2. The ability of development policies to inhibit terrorism depends on 
their implementation. A major failure of implementation occurred in the 
Philippines where projects and programs were determined without 
comprehensive community based needs assessments. Here projects 
tended to focus on hi-profile initiatives that offered a quick return on 
investment—not projects that communities needed the most.  In 
addition local corruption undermined the effectiveness of money spent. 
Clearly the community based program outlined above must be adhered 
to avoid a repetition in Iraq. Local accountability and thorough audits 
will be needed to reduce the ever-present problem of corruption. 
 
Finally the Rand study goes on to caution that social and economic 
policies do not eliminate terrorism.  Even if the community based development 
program makes progress at reducing the pull of extremism in Iraq, terrorism in 
that country will only be eliminated as part of a wider political and military 
strategy.  
                                                 
71 Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, Terrorism & Development: Using Social and Economic Development to 
Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003). 
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Assessment 
 Recent research at the Naval Postgraduate School is suggestive of the 
types of the economic/social programs that are likely to be effective in jump 
starting the economy while simultaneously combating the insurgency in Al-
Anbar province.  Two themes that provide a synthesis for this varied body of 
academic research are the shadow economy and associated business of 
insurgency and the theory of third generation gangs. Combined they can 
explain why the country has become so unstable, spiraling down a path of 
reduced growth and increased violence.  Conversely the models are also 
suggestive of certain actions that can reverse this decline and potentially set 
the country on a path of increased growth and reduced violence. 
 
 This synthesis provides insights as to what economic and insurgent 
patterns may evolve in the future. Specifically the existing system is highly 
unstable and prone to a vicious circle of reinforced violence and decline. In this 
scenario violence and the insurgency gain strength with time, but not enough 
to overthrow the central government.  On the other hand the synthesis 
suggests the potential of economic programs and policy actions at the local 
level to create a framework conducive to the creation of virtuous circles of 
reduced violence and improved growth.  In this environment the chances 
increase for success in combating the insurgency in al-Anbar improve 
dramatically. In this scenario, the Marines play a key role through their 
assistance in the implementation of strategic economic and social programs at 
the local level. 
 
